Leadership on the Line: John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis

By: Rohan Fernando -Wharton

The Cuban missile crisis is a classic case of leadership on the line. The stakes were monumental, there were choices to be made under constraints and only through enlightened judgment and strong leadership was the situation resolved peacefully.

Background

During the late 1950’s, it was widely believed that the US suffered from a “missile gap”, and that the USSR has a strategic superiority in inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) which could carry nuclear warheads from the USSR to the US. However, as a result of US intelligence work, the US President of the time President John F. Kennedy announced to the world in November 1961 that the Soviet ICBM superiority was a myth. In fact, the US had a substantial strategic superiority of ICBMs.

A number of Cold War events occurred just prior to the Cuban crisis, most notably Berlin 1 and the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. Despite these, there was talk of easing of tensions or “détente” between the two superpowers.

Domestically, Congressional elections were scheduled for November 1963. After the Bay of Pigs, the Republicans had been critical of the administration’s “do-nothing” policy toward Cuba and were calling for a second invasion. The administration went on the counter-offensive led by JFK. Bolstered by what they thought were Soviet assurances, they denied that there was any Soviet build-up in Cuba and countered that the Republican insistence of aggressive action was “irresponsible.” Kennedy also stated that if the USSR were to

place “offensive” weapons in Cuba, specifically ground-to-ground missiles with the ability to reach the US, the US would be forced to act aggressively and “protect its own security and that of its allies.”

During late September 1963, reports of Soviet missile build-up in Cuba intensified. The most reliable source of information, U-2 flights over Cuba, had been curtailed on September 9. The COMOR (the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance) decided to only let U-2s “peer” into Cuba by briefly going into Cuban airspace rather than patrolling the whole island as they had been doing. However, because of the reports of Soviet activity, COMOR authorized a special U-2 flight over Cuba on October 14th. The

photographs found unmistakable evidence of the Soviet installation of surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles and medium- and intermediate- range ballistic missiles with nuclear capability. According to estimates, these missiles could kill over 80 million Americans within minutes of launch. The president was alerted to the situation on Tuesday, October 16th.

The Thirteen Days of the Crisis

The crisis lasted just 13 days. JFK’s first decision was to assemble a team to develop the US response. This “ExCom” included members of the foreign policy administration, the military, the intelligence community and JFK’s close advisors, Theodore Sorenson and his brother, Robert F. Kennedy. It was chaired by JFK.

JFK knew that action was required. He had staked the credibility of his administration on the USSR not placing offensive weapons in Cuba and had outlined the consequences if they did. Doing nothing would irretrievably damage the credibility of his administration, would embolden the USSR to become more aggressive, and finally, would damage the credibility of the US to the World. However, JFK also felt, probably more than anyone in the ExCom, that nuclear war had to be avoided if at all possible, and that therefore the US reaction needed to be forceful yet restrained to avoid pushing the Soviets into a

corner.

The group considered four main options:

1. Do Nothing: This option had its premise that even with the Cuban missiles, the balance of power had not appreciably changed. However, this was quickly shelved by JFK given the need to act.

2. Diplomatic Channels: This option, consistent with traditional diplomacy, suggested that Khruschev be confronted with the information that the US had found out about the missiles. This option was again vetoed on the grounds that the US would not be acting in response to the threat, but rather by informing the USSR of the US discovery, the initiative would again pass to the USSR.

3. Surgical Strike: This option was to destroy all of the missile sites through a “surgical” air campaign before they were operationally ready. Although most ExCom members and JFK himself initially favored this plan, there were two key problems with it: 1) The Air Force was able to guarantee that only 90% of the missiles could be destroyed. 2) The air strike would kill thousands of the Russian personnel who were stationed in or around the installation sites. This would create a need for Khruschev to respond, probably by attacking US bases in Turkey or Berlin. Under NATO, this would necessitate the US attacking Soviet bases in the USSR which could lead to a nuclear war which neither side could win.

4. Blockade: This option involved creating a naval blockade around Cuba to prevent Soviet ships coming through. This option had some serious drawbacks, most obviously, that it did not prevent completion of the missile installations already in Cuba. However, its main advantage was that it allowed the US to respond aggressively to the USSR, while simultaneously not pushing the USSR into a corner. JFK decided for the blockade over the protests of the military and some advisors who advocated for the air strike. JFK then announced the policy to the Congress, almost all of whom disagreed with it (versus the air strike), foreign governments and the Soviets. Finally, on Monday, he announced it to the nation in a televised address, where he emphasized that the blockade was the initial step and that he had ordered preparations for further military action.

The blockade was put in place on Wednesday, October 24. The first ships to encounter it, the Gagarin and the Komiles, turned back. However, the first ship which did not stop (the Bucharest) an oil tanker, was allowed to proceed at the specific insistence of JFK over the demands of the military to board the ship. JFK waited for exactly the right ship before he authorized boarding – it was the Marcula which, given its Panamanian registration, would not be taken as a direct affront to the Soviets.

• He wrote a letter to Khruschev accepting the terms of the first Khruschev letter while ignoring the second

• He sent RFK to see the Soviet ambassador Dobrinin privately to warn the USSR that if there was no positive response by the next morning (Sunday), that the US would attack on Monday

The next morning, Khruschev publicly agreed to the deal and ordered the removal of the missiles.

Leadership Lessons

The Cuban crisis offers us numerous leadership lessons. Many of these parallel leadership traits such as the moral dimension, achieving workable unity, motivating, managing, and reaffirming values.

• Assembled the best team

As Gardner points out, most of our naïve visions of leadership focus on an individual as leader. However, leadership most often involves a team, as in this case. JFK made sure to assemble the best team he could for this crisis. He made sure not to only include people who would think like him. He wanted as many points of view aired. He also included people from all the relevant departments so that when a decision was ultimately made, the implementers would have buy-in to the decision. Finally, he constituted a group which was deliberately ad hoc since this was a situation which required a novel approach.

• Managed the group / team

JFK managed the ExCom to produce the best outcome. Paradoxically, this sometimes involved him not being present. As RFK notes, JFK was acutely aware of the tendency of people to only say what the President wants to hear. After giving the ExCom guidance, he therefore deliberately chose not to attend some meetings to allow all options to be considered.

• Envisioned and set goals

Although JFK allowed the ExCom to debate the options and come up with a

recommendation, he set the goals. He charged the group to “make an intensive survey of the dangers and all possible courses of action.” He also gave them specific direction. First, he wanted the US to act, not to respond to the USSR. Second, he wanted the team to think about all the likely consequences of the US action, not just the first Soviet reaction.

• Did not give up the initiative, maintained control of the situation

JFK was adamant that the US not give up the initiative by informing Khruschev hat the US had discovered the missiles. JFK wanted the announcement of the issile discovery and the US action to be announced simultaneously to maintain control over the situation.

Particularly through reading JFK’s account, one cannot help feel the depth of moral emotion which JFK displayed. He was burdened by the “specter of the death of the children of this country”13 and by the knowledge that he was deciding the fate of the entire nation and, potentially, the world. He was also troubled by the argument that bombing Cuba would be a “Pearl Harbor in reverse” and that that would be unacceptable to what the US stood for. This strong moral sense and upholding the moral traditions of the US imbued all of JFK’s decisions.

Many of the members of the ExCom had their own specific agendas. In particular, the military proved to be incredibly shortsighted in their recommendations. Their agenda was to bomb Cuba, no matter what the consequences. For instance, when Kennedy asked General Le May what the likely reaction of the Soviets would be to a US bombing of Cuba, he replied: “There would be no reaction.” General Le May was even quoted as saying on

Sunday October 28th, after the Russians agreed to withdraw the missiles, that “we should attack Monday in any case.” JFK was able to see through these parochial agendas and exhorted the ExCom to not act in the interests of their departments, but rather in the interests of the nation.

• Courage to change his mind given new evidence

JFK had the courage to change his mind. Whereas his first instinct was for the air strike, he ultimately chose to go with the blockade when the evidence from the air force suggested that the air strike would not be 100% percent successful and given the greater flexibility that the blockade offered.

• Had strategic vision and understood his opponent

More than anyone on the ExCom, JFK was the biggest advocate of giving Khruschev a way out. He knew that either a direct strike or an ultimatum would force Khruschev’s hand. As he put it in his American University speech: “Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to the choice of either a humiliating defeat or a nuclear war.” Another critical strategic action was to reply only to Khruschev’s first letter and not his second while simultaneously privately warning him that a refusal would result in an American attack. A public warning would have made it impossible for Khruschev to accept the terms of the deal.

• Achieving workable unity

Through the ExCom, JFK was able to achieve some workable unity and a commitment to the policy that was decided even when all of the implementers did not agree.

• Made decisions

In the final analysis, a decision had to be made. From the accounts, it is very clear that the ultimate decision for the blockade was taken by JFK, not the members of the ExCom.

• Stayed the course versus opponents

Any decision is going to have opponents. JFK stood his ground despite overwhelming opposition from the Congress, which urged for an air strike.

• Real world politics

All leaders have to have a measure of Realpolitik. JFK demonstrated this when Adlai Stevenson, the UN Ambassador, suggested that the US should trade the Turkish missiles for the Cuban missiles. Although not necessarily a far-fetched suggestion, JFK publicly berated him to win himself greater maneuvering room against the hawks who wanted an air strike.

A key feature of the blockade was the extent to which the administration directed from Washington circumventing the traditional military chain of command. Kennedy did not trust the military to carry out such a delicate operation which required restraint. As a result, he personally was involved in the minute details of the blockade, for instance, allowing the Bucharest to pass through the blockade but ordering the navy to board the Marcula, a move he felt would not humiliate the Soviets but which demonstrated US resolve.

• Served as a symbol

JFK understood that he served as a symbol for the nation. He appeared “calm and confident” in his TV announcement of the blockade. As RFK mentions, he was able to win the confidence of the country: “… we all felt the President, because of his wisdom and personal dignity, would have the support of a unified country.”

• Energy

As Gardner mentions, one trait of leaders is their high level of energy. This was evident in this situation where JFK (and the ExCom) did not sleep for six straight days during the crisis.

Potential Mistakes

It is difficult to speculate as to what could have been done better. Two possibilities are:

• Pre-planning

The administration should probably have prepared for the Soviet missile scenario ahead of time. However, most disregarded the missile rumors as beliefs of professional Communist haters in the CIA, not reality.

• Speed

The US decision could potentially have been made faster. However, this would likely have entailed fewer people in the ExCom, which would have meant less diversity of opinions, and less time would probably have led the US (mistakenly) into an air strike.

Conclusion

The Cuban missile crisis was a remarkable period. The threat of nuclear war was probably never greater than during those thirteen days. This was also the finest hour of the Kennedy Presidency. Kennedy, through his leadership, judgment and actions discussed above, was able to lead the World away from the brink of nuclear war. He showed restraint, allowed his opponent to evaluate his options and yet maintained a forceful, credible stance to achieve his objectives.